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Objective. Immigration and the economy were the most salient issues in British politics at the 2010
general election, yet the relationship between them remains unclear. This article questions whether
perception of the economic situation influenced hostility to immigration to Britain during the 2010
general election campaign.Method. This article employs a logistic regression model using the 2010
British Election Study to test the effect of economic perception and other previously identified
factors on hostility to immigration. Results. The results show that perception of the economy did
have an effect on hostility to immigration at the 2010 British general election. However, the effect is
negligible. Conclusion. The findings highlight the influence of other factors in predicting hostility
to immigration, particularly identity and culture, party identification, and policy-based factors. The
prominence of analyzing the effect of economic concerns in determining attitudes to immigration
appears misplaced.
Economic liberalization, increasing international mobility, and political instability have
contributed to unprecedented levels of migration in Britain (Ford, 2011:1017–18). In
response, there is now a wide range of survey data and subsequent academic analysis
available on British attitudes toward immigration (see John and Margetts, 2009; Ford
and Goodwin, 2010; Ford, 2011 as examples). Together, they show that opposition to
immigration has been increasing since the mid-1990s, and is especially powerful among
those with lower educational qualifications, the working classes, and those who feel that
their culture is threatened by immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2005:42). The breadth and depth
of opposition has also risen in the last decade (McLaren and Johnson, 2007:709), with 47
percent of respondents to the 2010 British Election Study (BES) regarding themselves as
angry about immigration to Britain.
The 2010 British general election came at a time of widespread economic uncertainty.
The financial crisis that preceded it saw market confidence evaporate, leading to the
nationalization of the Northern Rock bank and the U.K. government taking controlling
stakes in the Royal Bank of Scotland, Halifax Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds TSB. For the
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TABLE 1
Most Important Issue Facing Britain at the 2010 General Election
The economy 47%
Immigration 14%
Crime 5%
Unemployment 5%
Consumer debt 3%
N = 16,816.
SOURCE: British Election Study 2010.
first time since 1997, unemployment rose past 2 million (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010),
and the argument that the economy and immigration were linked was heavily advanced by
all major political parties during the 2010 general election campaign (Carey and Geddes,
2010). The then Prime Minister Gordon Brown spoke of the need for “British jobs for
British workers” in 2007 (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010), while the Liberal Democrats
proposed a regional economy-based immigration policy. The Conservatives tried to play
down the issue of immigration (Green, 2010), but still committed themselves to reducing
immigration “to tens of thousands rather than [per year] . . . hundreds of thousands” if in
government (Prince, 2010). Immigration became such a concern for voters that 14 percent
of respondents to the 2010 BES ranked it as the most important issue facing Britain.
However, the relationship between attitudes to the economy and hostility to immi-
gration remains underresearched, particularly in the context of the 2010 British general
election campaign, when—as now—the two issues were the most salient in British politics
(see Table 1). This article builds onmore general analyses and questionswhether perceptions
of the economic situation, on both retrospective/prospective and pocketbook/sociotropic
levels, contributed to hostility to immigration in Britain during the 2010 general election
campaign. First, it outlines the case for hypothesizing a relationship between attitudes to
the economy and immigration. Second, it outlines the case against, discussing other factors
that might contribute to hostility to immigration. Third, the article presents the results of
a logistic regression model using 2010 BES data. The model finds that while perceptions of
the economic situation did contribute to hostility to immigration, the effect is small. The
article concludes by briefly discussing the possible implications of this for future research.
Dependent and Independent Variables: Immigration and the Economy
Fourteen percent of respondents to the BES 2010 identified immigration as the most
important issue facing Britain. Migration to Britain is not a new phenomenon, with
the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act forming the first legislative attempt to restrict
immigration. Over time, immigration policy came to have an increasing focus on ancestry
and heritage (McLaren and Johnson, 2007:711), but race was also important in attitudes to
immigration. Nonwhite immigration engendered far more serious opposition than white
immigration, spilling over into “race riots” in Notting Hill as early as 1958 (Ford, 2008).
Moreover, since World War II, anti-immigration political campaigns by Enoch Powell, the
National Front, and the British National Party (BNP) have largely focused on nonwhite
immigrants (Ford, 2011:1020).
More recently, the Labour government post 1997 adopted a commitment to economic
migration as part of a wider economic policy (Flynn, Ford, and Somerville, 2010). Under
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this approach, “desirable” migrants, such as highly skilled workers and students, were
encouraged; those who were not deemed to contribute positively, such as asylum seekers
or “abusers of the system,” were discouraged. They achieved some success in decoupling
race from the debate about immigration (Ford, 2008). However, ultimately, New Labour’s
approach created the perception of an immigration system in crisis, and contributed to the
salience of the issue in the 2010 general election (Mulvey, 2011:1490).
The severity and duration of the recession were unprecedented, and in the 2010 BES, 47
percent of respondents identified the economy as the most important issue facing Britain.
The most severe economic downturn since the 1930s, the 2009 global recession had
substantial impact upon the British economy. It followed a prolonged period of economic
growth: between 1997 and 2007, U.K. gross domestic product (GDP) increased by an
average of 3.2 percent per year. Yet in 2008, GDP fell by 1.1 percent, with a further 4.4
percent contraction in 2009 (Giudice, Kuenzel, and Springbett, 2012:1).
The combination of the economic downturn and changing patterns of immigration
represents a significant change to lives of citizens in Britain and challenges citizens’ political
attitudes. If immigration were perceived to have contributed to the economic downturn, it
might be perceived as a threat. As Grayson (2013:389) notes, “threats provide citizens with
ontological security . . . about their own identity, their rightful position in the world and
who (or what) poses a danger to them.” Immigration does not therefore simply generate
rational responses devoid of feeling (Convoer and Feldman, 1986:51). It also generates
emotional responses that influence and shape political behavior (Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKeun, 2000; Huddy et al., 2005; Brader, 2006; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groe-
nendyk, 2009).
Gray (1990) argues that such emotional responses serve to trigger political action.
Emotional responses can be positive or negative, depending on the context. Major surveys
of political attitudes, including the BES utilized in this article, include questions on
emotions in relation to political action. In relation to negative emotions, the focus is largely
on the emotions of “fear” and “anger.” Fear as an emotion is based on anxiety; it promotes
cautious action and often different responses from person to person. On the other hand,
anger is a decisive action that generates strongly held negative convictions (Lockerbie,
1993; Valentino et al., 2008). Matheson and Anisman (2009) similarly argue that anger
is a much more active emotion than fear. Wagner (2014) suggests that anger is a more
appropriate emotion to analyze when considering political action in which blame can be
attached to an external actor. This is clearly the case with respect to the rise in immigration.
As McLaren (2012:171) argues, “politicians and institutions are likely to be blamed for
failing to control immigration adequately.” For this reason, and because anger represents
an articulated hostility (in contrast to “fear”), this article uses anger about immigration to
Britain as the dependent variable in the model.
Perceptions of the economy in relation to hostility to immigration are important not just
in the context of British politics, but also globally. International public opinion polling re-
peatedly suggests that while the public supports increasing international trade and financial
integration, this does not transfer to support for immigration (Malhotra,Margalit, andMo,
2013). Paradoxically, political elites in Western democracies appear to view immigration
as a necessary good for their economies, while at the same time, electoral realities dictate
otherwise (Sides and Citrin, 2007). Within this context, previous research has shown a link
between attitudes on issues related to the economy and immigration, specifically between
poor economic performance (and subsequent negative perception of the economy) and
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Citrin et al. (1997:860) argue that the substantial
amount of literature on economic perception and its effect on political activity amounts
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to the “general prediction that at the individual level, economic threat, whether real or
imagined, engenders opposition to immigration.”
Perceptions of the economy can be held at an individual level (the “pocketbook hy-
pothesis”) or at a national level (the “sociotropic hypothesis”) (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979,
1981; Dettrey, 2013). The pocketbook hypothesis argues that an individual’s perception of
his or her own economic situation affects the individual’s attitude to immigration, which
poses a real or perceived economic threat. This threat can take many forms. In times of
high unemployment, immigrants may be viewed as unwelcome competition for jobs and
wages (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Indeed, Ivarsflaten (2005:22–23) notes that there
has been a well-documented tendency in the social sciences to explain public opposition
toward immigration in economic terms as a clash of interests. Burns and Gimpel (2000)
contend that such perceived individual pressures are more likely to affect the low skilled and
low paid. Increased fears over job security at the individual level since the 2008 economic
downturn further supports the pocketbook hypothesis (Rydgren, 2008; Cutts, Ford, and
Goodwin, 2011:428–29).
The sociotropic hypothesis argues that perceptions of the national economy, rather than
individual circumstances, affect attitudes to immigration. Underlying this hypothesis is
the argument that liberal immigration policies generate a tax burden based on higher
welfare and public service spending (Passel and Fix, 1994; Citrin et al., 1997). Since 2010,
the British government has explicitly linked the issues of immigration and welfare. Citing
Labour’s period in government, David Cameron claimed that the fact that “five million
people . . . [were] on out-of-work benefits . . . at the same time as the largest wave of
migration [in British history showed a] vital connection between welfare reform . . . and
immigration” (Cameron, 2013). In the context of significant cuts to public services and
the prevailing rhetoric of austerity, the linkage of these two issues may well have had an
impact on public attitudes to immigration. Indeed, Skinner and Latter (2014) note that
the issue of immigration has increased to be of equal salience to voters in Britain as the
economy since 2010.
More recent work has demonstrated stronger pocketbook influences upon political
attitudes (see Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). Sanders (1999) found that, in the British
1997 general election, citizens were more likely to base their vote choice on pocketbook
than sociotropic economic perceptions. In a cross-national study, Gomez and Wilson
(2006) found that voters’ political sophistication influenced the relative importance of
pocketbook or sociotropic concerns, with the politically sophisticated more likely to “vote
pocketbook.” However, the evidence is not universal, and Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz
(2013) found that, in the American context, sociotropic economic concerns made people
more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies.
As well as distinctions between pocketbook and sociotropic perceptions of the econ-
omy, temporal distinctions are also important. An individual’s retrospective views might
differ from his or her prospective views. Killian, Schoen, and Aaron (2008) found that
prospective perceptions of the economy, both pocketbook and sociotropic, are generally
more positive than those that are retrospective. Lockerbie (1993) found that respondents
with a retrospectively negative pocketbook perception of the economy were more likely to
blame the government, and thus be politically and democratically dissatisfied. However,
as Citrin et al. (1997:862) argue, the economic situation is just one driver influencing
public attitudes toward immigration, yet it has often amounted to be the dominant factor
that is considered in social science research (Ivarsflaten, 2005). The next section outlines
other factors that might have influenced hostility to immigration at the 2010 general
election.
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Other Factors
Previous work has shown that economic perception is not the only factor influencing
attitudes toward immigration (Citrin et al., 1997; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior,
2004; Ivarsflaten, 2005; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). This study will therefore control
for a range of other factors that have been identified as affecting hostility to immigration.
The identity-based hypothesis proposes that economic perception is not the primary
predictor of hostility to immigration, but that such hostility arises from discomfort and
unease at threats to national identity and social culture. Grayson (2013:382–83) argues
that the anxieties linked to perceptions of transformations in culture and identity make
more restrictive immigration policies politically feasible. Ford and Goodwin (2010:15)
argue that those who engage with the media that espouse anti-immigration views are
more likely to be hostile to immigration, echoing earlier findings by Arzheimer (2009)
and Ivarsflaten (2005) regarding the relationship between reading the anti-immigrant
media and European extreme-right parties. McLaren and Johnson (2007:715) highlight
previous research showing that “exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities in Western
Europe and the United States” are more strongly linked to “symbolic concern(s) about
cultural threat and maintenance of cultural unity and distinctiveness” than to “individual
or collective economic threat.” However, Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten (2013) suggest
that while hostility to immigration is deeply felt by many British citizens, this may not
outweigh what they deem the “better angels of our nature”—theWestern norm of opposing
prejudice.
Such findings are not restricted to Britain. At the European level, Ivarsflaten (2005:35–
36) found that those educated to at least degree level were more likely to support liberal
immigration policies than those who were not, and that cultural unity and identity was the
most important explanation in these policy preferences. Similarly, analysis by the European
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shows that levels of education, income,
occupation, age, locality, religiousness, political positioning, and gender all impact, to
varying degrees, on hostility toward immigrants (Coenders et al., 2004:22–24). Further-
more, the issue of immigration has been racialized, with some migrant groups preferred to
others along a clear “ethnic hierarchy” (Ford, 2011:1020). Hampshire (2005) has argued
that nonwhite immigrants have become associated with “welfare parasitism.” The extent
of hostility toward minorities in Britain has also been shown to be linked to a range of
other factors, including class, gender, age, and education (Ford, 2008:614–15). Ivarsflaten
(2005:42–44) also identified that hostility to immigration in Britain tends to be more
established in those who are white, male, older, and working class.
Hostility to immigration has also been associated with support for far-right political
parties. Party identification has long been shown to be a predictor of attitudes to immigra-
tion (So¨derlund and Kestila¨-Kekkonen, 2009; Bale, Hampshire, and Partos, 2011; Cutts,
Ford, and Goodwin, 2011; Goodwin, 2011).1 Parties further to the left of the political
spectrum have traditionally been more receptive to immigration to Britain, while those on
the right have been more hostile (Goodwin, 2011). Ford and Goodwin (2010:8–10) argue
that contemporary support for the anti-immigrant BNP prior to 2010 was concentrated
among working-class men in the north of England aged 35 or older, who viewed immi-
gration as a concern almost to the exclusion of all other factors. Furthermore, an analysis
of the attitudinal profile of BNP supporters in the 2009 European Parliament elections
1Using party identification has its detractors among the scholars of British electoral politics. However,
running any other variable relating to party support (such as voting intention) did not change the results of
the model.
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showed that they are “ very much more anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic, racially prejudiced,
homophobic, and hostile towards mainstream parties than the average respondent” (Cutts,
Ford, and Goodwin, 2011:427).
As well as identity-based and party identification factors, hostility to immigration has
also been linked with attitudes to political policies. Whitaker and Lynch (2011) note
the relationship between euroscepticism and attitudes to immigration, which might be
due to the perceived threat posed by decreasing national sovereignty and the wish to
restrict immigration as a consequence (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Soroka et al. (2015) suggest that
pressures from immigrants on free national health-care provision might generate hostility
to immigrants, an issue that has been highly politicized in recent years (Dustmann, Frattini,
and Hall, 2010). Finally, the model controls for attitudes related to military intervention
in foreign countries. This is a policy issue that has polarized opinion across Western
democracies. Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin (2011) also found that attitudes to British military
involvement in Afghanistan influenced support for the anti-immigrant BNP prior to 2010.
Our model will control for each of these previously identified indicators of hostility to
immigration.
Data and Methods
This study employs a logistic regression model to examine whether perception of the
economic situation has an effect in predicting hostility to immigration to Britain at
the 2010 general election. Given the prominence of the economy in British political
debate following the financial crisis, the 2010 general election provides a unique oppor-
tunity to determine the relationship between attitudes to the economy and hostility to
immigration. The model uses data gathered from the 2010 BES Campaign Internet Panel
Study, which conducted a preelection survey (n = 16,816) between March 29 and April
7, 2010.2 Respondents were asked about their attitudes to various aspects of politics, in-
cluding immigration and the economy, political parties, and areas of policy. They were also
asked to choose up to four emotions from a list of 10 that best described their feelings
about immigration. Four were positive feelings (happy, hopeful, confident, and proud) and
four were negative (angry, disgusted, uneasy, and afraid). Two further options (no feelings,
don’t know) would exclude any substantive choices made.
As noted earlier, this model focuses on anger as a means of articulating hostility to
immigration. “Angry about immigration” is therefore the dependent variable. “Uneasy”
and “afraid” articulate an emotional response related to fear, which, as already discussed, is
less helpful than “anger” in understanding a clearly expressed opposition to immigration.
“Disgust” does little but replicate “anger” as an emotion (Marcus, Neuman, andMacKeun,
2000; MacKuen et al., 2010). While some have argued that anger and disgust can mean
potentially different things to respondents in some contexts (see Wagner, 2014), studies
examining attitudes toward immigration have often focused on “anger” alone as a dependent
variable (Banks and Valentino, 2012). To test this, the model was run twice, using “anger
about immigration” and “disgust about immigration” as separate dependent variables, with
no substantive difference in the results. “Anger about immigration” is a dummy variable,
recoded to represent not angry about immigration (0) and angry about immigration (1).
Table 2 shows the extent to which people considered themselves angry about immigration.
2The model records N = 13,361. This is due to missing values on the independent variables relating to
economic perception. However, this is still a very large sample size, and enough to provide evidence for this
study.
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TABLE 2
Anger About Immigration
Yes (%) No (%)
Are you angry about immigration? 45.3 54.7
N = 16,816.
SOURCE: British Election Study 2010.
Themain independent variable, perception of the economy, is split into four separate vari-
ables: “retrospective pocketbook,” “retrospective sociotropic,” “prospective pocketbook,”
and “prospective sociotropic” perceptions. Each variable is measured using a five-point
scale, with 1 representing “got/get a lot better” and 5 representing “got/get a lot worse.”
Given the debate between “pocketbook” and “sociotropic” perceptions of the economy,
as well as potential temporal differences in economic perception, these variables are kept
separate, as each warrants analysis in its own right.
Alongside the main independent variables, the model controls for various predictors of
hostility to immigration highlighted in the literature review. In relation to the literature on
identity and culture and immigration (see Ivarsflaten, 2005; McLaren and Johnson, 2007;
Grayson, 2013), the model controls for a respondent’s ethnicity, class, age, sex, religion,
educational qualification, and the newspaper he or she reads. Ethnicity is coded as non-
white British (0) and white British (1). Class is split into two variables, and coded as not
upper middle class (0) and upper middle class (1), and not skilled working class (0) and
skilled working class (1). Two categories of age (18–24 and 35–44) are controlled for: those
aged 35–44 were highlighted by Ford and Goodwin (2010) as most likely to be hostile to
immigration, and 18–24 represents the youngest respondents, expected to be least likely
to be hostile to immigration. Sex is coded as female (0) and male (1). Religion is split into
two variables to allow distinction between those who are Christian (1) and non-Christian
(0), and those who belong to another religion (Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, or other religion) (1) and those who do not (0). Educational qualification is coded as
no degree (0) and degree or higher (1). Finally, the model controls for whether a respondent
reads an anti-immigration newspaper, coded as does not read Daily Express/Daily Mail (0)
and does read Daily Express/Daily Mail (1), as these two papers have consistently espoused
an anti-immigrant stance.
Given the prominence of immigration as an issue at the 2010 general election, the three
main political parties (Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat) are controlled for
in the model, alongside the two most prominent anti-immigrant parties in 2010 (U.K.
Independence Party (UKIP) and BNP). Each party identification variable has been recoded
in the same fashion as the dependent variable: do not identify (0) and identify (1).
The final section of variables in the model controls for the relationship between hostility
to immigration and attitudes to certain aspects of public policy. The variables “Britain’s
membership of the EU” and “Britain’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan” are coded
on a 1–5 scale, from strongly approve (1) to strongly disapprove (5). The variable asking if
respondents are angry at the current state of the National Health Service is coded as not
angry (0) and angry (1). The model also controls for Labour’s handling of the financial
crises, coded on a 1–5 scale, from very well (1) to very badly (5). Controlling for previously
indicated predictors of hostility to immigration allows an investigation of the extent to
which perception of the economy had an impact on respondents’ likelihood of being
hostile to immigration at the 2010 general election.
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TABLE 3
Logistic Regression Detailing Predictors of “Anger About Immigration” at the 2010 British
General Election
β SE Odds Ratio
Constant –3.680 0.157 0.025
Economic perception
Retrospective pocketbook 0.097∗∗∗ 0.025 1.102
Retrospective sociotropic 0.069∗∗ 0.024 1.072
Prospective pocketbook 0.064∗ 0.029 1.066
Prospective sociotropic 0.021 0.027 1.022
Identity/culture
White British 0.341∗∗∗ 0.077 1.407
Upper middle class –0.244∗∗∗ 0.053 0.783
Skilled working class 0.223∗∗ 0.081 1.250
18- to 24-year-olds –0.198 0.122 0.820
35- to 44-year-olds 0.197∗∗∗ 0.053 1.217
Male 0.225∗∗∗ 0.042 1.252
Christian 0.125∗∗ 0.042 1.134
Non-Christian religions –0.317∗∗ 0.095 0.728
Degree –0.212∗∗∗ 0.045 0.809
Anti-immigrant newspaper 0.414∗∗∗ 0.050 1.512
Party identification
Conservative 0.349∗∗∗ 0.057 1.512
Labour 0.043 0.060 1.044
Liberal Democrat –0.167∗ 0.073 0.846
U.K. Independence Party 0.546∗∗∗ 0.120 1.727
British National Party 0.874∗∗∗ 0.180 2.397
Policy
Membership of EU 0.503∗∗∗ 0.018 1.653
Afghanistan –0.024 0.024 0.976
NHS 0.741∗∗∗ 0.054 2.097
Labour—financial crisis 0.120∗∗∗ 0.021 1.128
Cox and Snell R2 = 0.238; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.317; –2 log likelihood = 14,862.184. N = 13,361.
Bold figures denote significant effects: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Dependent variable: Anger at
immigration to Britain.
SOURCE: 2010 British Election Study.
Results
Table 3 presents results from a logistic regression analysis modeling hostility to immi-
gration in the 2010 BES data set. While the model shows that those with a more negative
perception of the economic situation are indeed more likely to be hostile to immigration,
the effect is small, and much smaller than other variables in the model.3
Three of the four economic perception predictors show statistically significant but small
effects on hostility to immigration. For the retrospective pocketbook perception (odds
ratio of 1.10), retrospective sociotropic perception (odds ratio of 1.07), and prospective
pocketbook perception (odds ratio of 1.07) variables, the odds ratios are very close to 1,
3Results here are discussed in terms of odds ratios (eb). The odds ratio shows how changes in the independent
variable influence the odds of the “event.” In this case, the “event” is “anger about immigration.” Odds ratios
higher than 1 indicate a positive relationship (i.e., more likely to be hostile to immigration), and odds ratios
lower than 1 indicate a negative relationship (i.e., less likely to be hostile to immigration). The closer the odds
ratio is to 1, the smaller the effect of the independent variable is.
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suggesting that each had very little impact upon hostility to immigration. The impact of a
prospective sociotropic perception was not statistically significant. The other independent
variable in the model related to economic perception (Labour’s handling of the financial
crisis) also had a very small positive impact on hostility to immigration, with an odds ratio
of 1.13. For each of the economic perception predictor variables, the magnitude of their
effect on hostility to immigration is small to the point that they are practically irrelevant.
Together, the results of this model indicate that at the 2010 general election, perception of
the economy did not have any meaningful impact on hostility to immigration.
In contrast to indicators relating to economic perception, many of the indicators related
to the identity-based hypothesis were supported in the model. White British respondents
(odds ratio of 1.41) were more likely to be hostile to immigration, as were those who
identified themselves as skilled working class (odds ratio of 1.25). Men (odds ratio of 1.25)
were also more likely to be hostile, as were Christians (odds ratio of 1.13) and those aged
35–44 (odds ratio of 1.22) and those who read an anti-immigrant newspaper (odds ratio of
1.51). On the other hand, those who identified as upper middle class (odds ratio of 0.78)
were less likely to be hostile to immigration. Those of non-Christian religions (odds ratio of
0.73) were also less likely to be hostile, as were those with a degree qualification (odds ratio
of 0.81). The only group without a significant impact upon hostility to immigration were
those aged 18–24. All of the statistically significant variables relating to the identity-based
hypothesis had a greater impact in predicting hostility to immigration than those related
to economic perception.
Most of the party identification variables in the model also had a significant impact.
Those who identified with the Conservatives (odds ratio of 1.51) were more likely to
be hostile to immigration. There was no significant impact on immigration for those
who identified with Labour; however, those who identified with the Liberal Democrats
(odds ratio of 0.85) were less likely to be hostile to immigration. Those who identified
with UKIP (odds ratio of 1.73) or the BNP (odds ratio of 2.40) were more likely to be
hostile to immigration, with each odds ratio suggesting a large effect. Association between
hostility to immigration among UKIP and BNP identifiers is unsurprising, and likewise
a lack of hostility among Liberal Democrat identifiers is to be expected. Again, however,
those significant variables relating to party identification all had larger impact in predicting
hostility to immigration than those relating to economic perception.
The final group of variables in the model is related to policy attitudes, and againmost had
an impact on hostility to immigration. Those with a more negative view of membership of
the European Union (odds ratio of 1.65) were more likely to be hostile, while there was no
significant relationship between those who opposed Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan
and hostility to immigration. Finally, those who expressed anger at the state of the National
Health Service (odds ratio of 2.10) were more likely to be hostile to immigration. Again,
each of the statistically significant variables relating to policy had a greater impact on
predicting hostility to immigration than those relating to economic perception. Together,
the model shows that perception of the economy played only a small part in predicting
hostility to immigration at the 2010 general election.
Conclusion
Hostility to immigration has many different predicting variables, often deeply rooted in
social structures and norms. The results of this study lend support to previously identified
indicators of hostility to immigration. Indicators related to identity and culture are found to
have an effect on predicting hostility to immigration, echoing previous analyses (Ivarsflaten,
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2005; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Ford, 2008; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2011), with a
respondent’s ethnicity, class, age, sex, religion, educational qualification, and the newspaper
he or she reads influencing their emotional attitude in terms of “anger” to immigration.
Findings relating to party identification indicators also support previous research (Ford and
Goodwin, 2010; Bale, Hampshire, and Partos, 2011, Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2011;
Goodwin, 2011;Whitaker and Lynch, 2011). Those who identified with parties with more
conservative policies on immigration were more likely to be hostile to immigration, while
those who identified with parties with more liberal policies were less likely to be hostile
to immigration. Finally, research suggesting that policy attitudes are also likely to predict
hostility to immigration (see Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2011;
Whitaker and Lynch, 2011) was also supported in this study.
However, this study has called into question the extent to which economic indicators
influenced hostility to immigration at the 2010 general election. The effect of economic
perception on hostility to immigration in this study is statistically significant, but very
small, and outweighed by every other statistically significant indicator in the model. Much
more important in driving hostility toward immigration were matters relating to identity,
party identification, and policy. This article therefore supports the conclusions of Ivars-
flaten (2005:22–24), arguing that previous research has placed unjustifiable weight on the
importance of economic concerns in determining political attitudes and that, instead, other
factors should be considered in analyzing hostility to immigration, rather than perception
of the economy.
As Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten (2013:16) rightly argue, the intricate tradeoffs between
the popularity of policies and their impact on electoral reputation continue to undermine
the complexity of the politics of immigration. However, as this article has shown, the effect
of perception of the economy in contributing to hostility to immigration is small, and its
prominence in this particular area of study of political attitudes appears misplaced.
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